



Early Journal Content on JSTOR, Free to Anyone in the World

This article is one of nearly 500,000 scholarly works digitized and made freely available to everyone in the world by JSTOR.

Known as the Early Journal Content, this set of works include research articles, news, letters, and other writings published in more than 200 of the oldest leading academic journals. The works date from the mid-seventeenth to the early twentieth centuries.

We encourage people to read and share the Early Journal Content openly and to tell others that this resource exists. People may post this content online or redistribute in any way for non-commercial purposes.

Read more about Early Journal Content at <http://about.jstor.org/participate-jstor/individuals/early-journal-content>.

JSTOR is a digital library of academic journals, books, and primary source objects. JSTOR helps people discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content through a powerful research and teaching platform, and preserves this content for future generations. JSTOR is part of ITHAKA, a not-for-profit organization that also includes Ithaka S+R and Portico. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.

RECENT BOOKS ON THE PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION

In these latter days, when men have the fear of the *Zeitgeist* before their eyes, a man of independent judgment awakens a hopeful expectation. A virile discussion, like Professor Ladd's,¹ delights us by its failure to observe a servile attitude toward the *Zeitgeist* monster; and at the same time it is awake to living issues and to men's thoughts.

Most men who have essayed anything in psychology or philosophy or theology for the past decade have felt constrained to inform us—often explicitly in the preface—that they were following the “historic method.” Bearing this stamp, almost any type of speculation might hope to become current coin for magazine circulation. Latterly, however, the phrase has but thinly disguised the assumption on the part of many writers that a recital of historic facts is the only kind of “explanation” that has value. Exegesis of the Bible becomes the sole method of producing theology. The natural history of mind, of religion, of morals, or of society is the last word, and constitutes the *science* of these things. Whoever goes beyond this modern positivist attitude is guilty of the heinous crime of “speculation.” Let him be anathema, for the *Zeitgeist* has spoken! This is transcendental materialism.

For our part we see no reason why the eminent psychologist, Professor Ladd, should not be the dragon-slayer to dispose of this modern monster of rational method. A “cool British stare” ought to do a good deal to disarm the *Zeitgeist*; and Professor Ladd has had the nerve to ignore it to an extent that must be embarrassing to it, if not fatal to its assumptions. Which thing is a parable. Professor Ladd's study of mind has led him to explicit utterance on such doctrines as the reality of self, of religion, of rationality. He has two or three fixed points which are not dissolved away or explained away by the “historic method” of noting psychologic and historic development. He evidently believes in a self that is something more than “groups of consciousness.” Religion for him is not “explained” by reciting the facts of the development. And even reason has rights of its own which he respects, and is no automatic echo of nerve-life. Here is a rationalist who keeps his feet on the earth, but feels no need of resting his head there.

In religion, particularly, where the data are so purely subjective and so elusive, the temptation is to choose between the speculative romancing of those who, spider-like, spin their material out of themselves, and those who eschew philosophy as intrinsically unassimilable to religious problems. Professor Ladd shows himself familiar with the endlessly

¹ *The Philosophy of Religion*. By George Trumbull Ladd. 2 vols. New York: Scribner, 1905. 616+590 pages. \$7 net.

rich and complex data of experience and history, and keeps close to these data. But his confidence that mind can think these data into a systematic and satisfying unity is a strong moving principle.

"No philosophy of religion can longer hope to claim the attention of well-informed minds which does not avail itself of all the resources now put at its disposal by the historical and comparative study of religions" (Vol. I, p. 8). With faithfulness to this principle, he has familiarized himself with the mass of data involved. But, "on the other hand, it cannot be admitted that the historical and comparative study of the world's religions is, of itself, sufficient to constitute a philosophy of religion; nor does such study satisfy fully the demands either of man's intellectual curiosity or of his practical and spiritual life" (Vol. I, p. 8). "The human mind is so constituted that it demands to know what the facts of man's religious history signify for our view of the ultimate realities which condition his existence and his evolution; and for the highest ideals and supreme values of life" (Vol. II, p. 5). He thus trusts the nature of mind as expressed in its own demands, and regards the systematizing intellect as working by laws which have a sanction and authority of their own in the act of interpretation. The logics and faiths of life have been obscured for a time, but they have always been the principle of real movement, and must again help us out of this motionless stare at history. We must at least grow speculative "wings" to counteract the leaden feet of pragmatism which plod so drearily.

A philosophy of religion cannot be worked from the side of the speculative intellect without falling into the unfruitful attitude of apriorism. But equally unfruitful and unsatisfying is it to deny the mind any rights save that of counting and tabulating facts. A philosophy, we repeat, is an attempt to exhibit the facts together in a speculative or theoretic system that will satisfy the reflective mind. The man who simply recites the facts by the "historic method" represents no real movement in philosophy. The man who simply speculates represents nothing but movement. We have "philosophies" of both types purporting to *explain* religion. The most significant thing to say about the present work is that the author has sailed a pretty clear course between wreck-strewn Scylla and Charybdis, in that the rights of history as well as the native demands of the mind have been reckoned with. His rudder—i. e., his theory of knowledge—seems to be workable; and this has been the weak place in most essays in religious philosophy.

Professor Ladd has been a vigorous thinker in the field of metaphysics and psychology, and this his most comprehensive attempt in philosophy

has been awaited with much interest by many thinkers. His general position on fundamental problems is well known. For the thoroughgoing thinker any new philosophical work is already pretty definitely evaluated, if we know the author's presuppositions and general type of philosophy. If he is logical, we know in general where his presuppositions will lead him; if he is not logical, neither his presuppositions nor his book will be of surpassing value. The strictly individual contribution must be worked out within the limits prescribed by the presupposition laid down. Professor Ladd's published essays in psychology, metaphysics, and epistemology exhibit the directive principles of his philosophy, and these principles can be most explicitly studied here. The general type of explanation presented in these two volumes on *The Philosophy of Religion* was anticipated; for the author works to a logical end. But his originality in working out the different aspects of the complex problem of religion constitutes a work of great value.

Here is a cautious, sane, painstaking attempt to view all the facts, to weigh their significance, and to construct a theory that shall "hang together" and satisfy the mind. The work is erudite and encyclopedic, even heavily so at times; but the vital dialectic of his discussions, and the living search for truth that dominates the whole work, will make it of intense interest to the student of the subject. We regard it as an enriching contribution to the developing science of religion. The apriorism of Edward Caird, the seductive one-sidedness of Sabatier, and the arbitrariness of Fairbairn will all find correction in this rather massive treatment, which will doubtless be criticised because of its attempt to give due proportion to all aspects of the truth, while justifying the place of each in the system. The author has avoided the fallacy of an over-simplification in the interests of a method—the method which unifies by forming class terms, or which makes a dominant interest to eclipse all other facts.

The plan in general of the work is to treat analytically in the first volume the data of religion, whether drawn from history or from psychology. The second volume treats these data by the synthetic laws of thought, and moves toward a "philosophy" of religion. Prof. Tiele's corresponding designation of the two volumes of his *Science of Religion* as respectively "Morphological" and "Ontological" does not fully express Professor Ladd's constructive interest and attention to detail. The problems of religion are perennially the same, and we need not tabulate them here. The limits of this review forbid the outline of the discussions. The root-thought is that the persistent religious ideals that develop in human life not only are constitutional—immanent laws of life—

but correspond to the objective fact. Religious faith in the objective truth of its ideals is analogous to the cognitive trust in the truth of its ideals. There is a kingdom of God demanded by the forms of our religious consciousness, just as there is a kingdom of truth demanded by our cognitive consciousness. Here again Tiele's position is recalled. Science rests on essentially the same basis as religion; and the latter has as secure psychological vindication as the former. This is the fruitful epistemological emphasis of modern times.

To trace these unfolding ideals of religion, to discriminate immanent laws and shaping environment, to reach central "essentials" of religion without falling into methods of academic abstraction which falsify the actual religious life—this involves the profound discussion of a variety of problems. Religion is described, in the phrase of Victor Branford, as "the great psychic uplift of the race" (Vol II, p. 444). Since the religious fact is universal and permanent and constitutional, it seems legitimate to affirm that "rationality is the ultimate test of the values of religion" (Vol. I, p. 80), where rationality is taken in the comprehensive sense. Theism and the ethical ultimate are the inevitable forms of rationality thus considered.

A soundly reasoned discussion of successive problems occupies the second volume, though the author protests his purpose to be "at the most an effort to contribute to the better understanding and higher appreciation of the ultimate meaning and supreme value of the religious experience and religious development of man." An early chapter on "The Standard of Religious Values" may be cited as among the specially significant discussions. Christianity is disclosed as the supreme expression of religious life, not by any syllogistic demonstration, but as realizing best the ideals that are native, and as satisfying the constitutional, i. e., the "rational." The permanent form of religion, "the future of religion," the destiny of the individual man and of the race—these problems are exhibited in the light of the principles in terms of which they must be thought. And though dogmatism utters no voice here, these problems which forever haunt the reflective mind are treated in a large way which ministers to confidence. Reason in the comprehensive sense—i. e., intelligence in possession of all its modes of insight—is shown to confirm the optimistic conviction concerning the world-problem.

HERBERT ALDEN YOUTZ.

CONGREGATIONAL COLLEGE OF CANADA,
Montreal, Can.

The problems of philosophy are four, Höffding says.² (1) The problem of consciousness. Psychology describes the actual development of consciousness. Even if the other problems of philosophy were to be declared insoluble, or to have arisen through a misunderstanding, the psychological problem, the question as to the nature and laws of life, would remain. (2) The problem of knowledge. The task here is the investigation of the forms and principles of thought, a task undertaken by formal logic. But these forms and principles only enable thought to be in harmony with itself, and do not lead out beyond thought itself. In every application of these forms and principles to phenomena the question arises: With what right does this application take place? Thus arises the possibility of a discipline which shall investigate the conditions for a knowledge of existence, and the limits of such a knowledge—epistemology. (3) The problem of existence. When we deduce the consequences of everything we know, what nature must we attribute to that existence of which we ourselves are members? What are the possibilities which display themselves to thought when it seeks to work up the data of experience into one general conception of the world? Idealism or materialism, pluralism or monism? This is the ontological problem. (4) The problem of value. Our attitude toward existence is not merely that of perceiving and understanding; existence excites our feeling so that we express judgments assigning or denying its worth. Certain judgments upon human actions are ethical; others upon life as a totality are religious. As the ultimate principle of science is faith in the conservation of energy, so analogously, the ultimate principle of religion is faith in the conservation of values—a conception which is the gist of the author's *Religionsphilosophie*, shortly to be translated into English.

One may well agree with Professor James's estimation of Höffding as "one of the wisest, as well as one of [the most learned of living philosophers." James classifies him as pragmatist—straining a point to do so, it seems to me—but Höffding, who ought to know, calls himself "a critical monist." I think it should be added, to save misunderstanding, that the book, since it is so compact and profound, will be of more service as a résumé of philosophic theory for advanced students than as an introduction for beginners.

Flournoy³ modestly claims simply to rehearse the conclusions of

² *The Problems of Philosophy*. By Harald Höffding. Translated by Galen M. Fischer. With a Preface by William James. New York: Macmillan, 1905. 201 pages. \$1.25.

³ *Les principes de la psychologie religieuse*. Par Th. Flournoy. Paris: Schleicher, 1905.

specialists in psychology, but he really does more than this and adds suggestions of importance of his own. Judged by the few works for which we are already indebted, Flournoy finds that religious psychology suggests the two following principles: (1) The exclusion of transcendence. This principle is negative and interdictory, so to speak, by virtue of which psychology refrains from any judgment upon the objective import or bearing of religious phenomena, and declines to discuss the possible existence and the nature of an invisible world. The estimations of worth and of transcendent reality by which religious experiences are accompanied in the consciousness of the subject are treated as *mental data* pure and simple, leaving out of account the questions of truth and value. (2) The biological interpretation of religious phenomena. This principle is positive and heuristic, by virtue of which psychology envisages the phenomena as manifestation of a vital process. Thus psychology endeavors to determine the psycho-physiological nature of religion, the laws of belief and development, the normal and pathological variations, the conscious and sub-conscious dynamic, and in a general way, the relations of the religious with other functions, and the rôle in the entire life of the individual and, consequently, of the race.

Thus comprehended, if religious psychology does not settle the final questions which man has always put to himself with regard to his destiny and the mystery of things, it at least tends to throw light upon the philosophical speculation by its contribution of all the knowledge accessible to scientific investigation as to the phenomena of the individual religious consciousness; and, from the practical point of view, it brings to the teacher, and to all those who have charge of souls, some valuable indications which enable them to do more good (or at least less evil!). It would be difficult to find a saner statement of the task, method, possibilities, and limits of the new science, than in this book.

GEORGE B. FOSTER.

WHAT IS THE CONTENT OF CHRISTIANITY WHICH MODERN APOLOGETICS UNDERTAKES TO DEFEND?

If the question were, What has apologetics sought to defend? the answer would be easily forthcoming in an appeal to history. When, however, one asks what it is in Christianity which modern apologetics undertakes to defend, the question becomes more serious. It might call first for a definition of Christianity, and then for the particular aspects of it which in our present intellectual environment make faith difficult. Or the question